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This paper examines how trade liberalization aects the incentives of rms
to innovate. Specically we study how a reduction in trade barriers aects
rms' investment in process R&D, and what this implies for industry pro-
ductivity. Process R&D refers to investment designed to reduce production
costs, thereby making the rm more productive. A key feature of process
R&D is that its outcome is stochastic. Higher R&D spending only raises the
likelihood that the rm will realize a higher level of productivity. However, it
is the realized level of productivity that determines the rm's performance,
including its domestic sales, export sales and protability. Only productive
rms will be able to survive in the market-place, and only the most produc-
tive will be able to bear the cost of exporting. Hence the type of R&D decision
we focus on is one where rms choose their investment level with a view to
boosting their chance of success in both domestic and export markets.
Innovation incentives depend on such factors as market size, toughness
of existing competition, and the potential for entry and exit of competitors.1
Trade liberalization aects all of these factors simultaneously. Firms face
tougher import competition at home and may lose market share to imports,
which tends to reduce the benet of undertaking R&D. On the other hand,
they gain easier access to export markets and hence may gain market share
abroad. This may lead rms to raise their R&D spending. Trade liberaliza-
tion may also aect market structure, thus changing the number not only of
foreign but also of domestic competitors. Obviously, then, trade liberaliza-
tion has non-trivial eects on R&D incentives. Disentangling these eects is
the rst task of the paper.
Changes in R&D investment represent a direct channel through which
trade liberalization aects industry productivity. Another is the selection of
rms into domestic and export markets.2 By this we mean that trade liber-
1See, for example, the seminal paper by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), as well as the
more recent work by Aghion et al. (2004, 2005).
2The selection eect is a feature of heterogeneous rm models, such as Melitz (2003).
1alization may force the least ecient rms to exit the market, but provides
export opportunities to rms that previously found exporting too costly.
However, since R&D investment as well as domestic and export market par-
ticipation are endogenous, and since all of these decisions are directly aected
by trade liberalization, the direct eect of R&D and the selection eect will
interact to determine industry productivity and social welfare. Examining
this interaction is the second task.
The current paper makes progress on both tasks by providing a very
simple international trade model in which these eects of trade liberaliza-
tion can be studied. Our model is a variant of the reciprocal dumping model
(Brander, 1981; Brander and Krugman, 1983), in which rms are ex post het-
erogeneous a la Melitz (2003). Firms decide on entry and their R&D spending
before observing their marginal cost. R&D simply shifts the cost distribution.
Firms then individually learn their marginal cost, and nally play a Bayesian
Cournot game determining their domestic and foreign sales. The model al-
lows us to derive the comparative static eects of a reduction in trade costs
on R&D, domestic output, and exports at the rm level. It also lets us de-
termine how trade liberalization aects the cut-o levels of rm productivity
that separate rms that are not able to sell any output from the more pro-
ductive ones that serve the domestic market, and the latter from the most
productive ones that also export. From the changes in rm-level decisions
and the selection eects induced by changes in the cut-o values we can then
compute how trade liberalization aects aggregate industry productivity.
This novel approach of modelling rm heterogeneity in an oligopolistic
market rather than in monopolistic competition has an important benet|
in addition to its simplicity. In particular, it explicitly reproduces output and
mark-up adjustments by rms, which are among the most robust empirical
regularities of trade liberalization (see Tybout (2003) and Wagner (2007)).3
Both adjustment channels are empirically important. See Lileeva and Treer (2007), Green-
away and Kneller (2007), and Wagner (2007) for recent surveys of the literature.
3Output and mark-up eects are typically absent in monopolistic competition models.
See Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) for an exception.
2We are able to derive sucient conditions under which trade liberalization
reduces the price-cost margins and domestic sales of import-competing rms,
expands export markets for very ecient rms, and increases eciency at the
plant level. In our setup, plant level eciency is endogenous as rms directly
adjust their R&D in response to the risks and opportunities associated with
economic integration.
We examine the eects of trade liberalization in two scenarios, a short-
run scenario in which there is no entry, and a long-run scenario in which free
entry and exit of rms determines the market structure. We are especially
interested in identifying trade liberalization eects that are robust in that
they hold across dierent market structures and can therefore be expected
to occur across a wide range of industries irrespective of the time frame
and of (often unobserved) sector-specic entry and exit costs. Among other
things, we show, that trade liberalization (i) raises (reduces) aggregate R&D
spending when trade costs are low (high); and (ii) forces rms at the bottom
of the productivity distribution to produce zero expected output. The two
eects determining how industry productivity reacts to trade liberalization
may hence go in the same or in opposite directions. In particular, the direct
eect coming from changes in R&D counteracts (reinforces) the selection
eect when trade costs are high (low). However, we are able to prove that
the selection eect dominates so that expected industry productivity rises
unambiguously as trade costs fall.
Firm heterogeneity plays a crucial role in obtaining these results. This, of
course, is obvious when it comes to the selection eect, which does not exist
when rms are homogeneous. Surprisingly, however, it is rm heterogeneity
that drives the non-monotonicity in the eect of trade liberalization on ag-
gregate R&D spending. When rms are homogeneous, trade liberalization
can be shown to unambiguously raise industry-level R&D spending.
Our paper is most closely related to the recent work of Costantini and
Melitz (2008), and Atkeson and Burstein (2006) who also examine innova-
tion and export decisions in a model with heterogeneous rms. Both papers
3start from a situation in which rms already dier in their initial productiv-
ity before an innovation opportunity arises (a binary choice in the former,
a continuous choice in the latter paper), and then study how productivity
dierences evolve over time when trade costs fall. The former paper examines
the transition dynamics between two steady states, and nds that productiv-
ity eects depend on whether liberalization is anticipated and on how quickly
it is implemented. The latter paper studies the long-run dynamics. It shows
that a reduction in trade costs induces more (less) productive rms to spend
more (less) on innovation, thus becoming even more (less) productive over
time.4
By contrast, rms in our model decide on innovation investment be-
fore they know their productivity. This assumption allows us to isolate the
innovation- and selection-induced changes in productivity from eects gen-
erated by initial conditions. Furthermore, in our model of oligopolistic com-
petition, rms choose their R&D level while taking into account the risks of
facing tougher competition triggered by trade liberalization. Tougher com-
petition aects their R&D choice directly, and not only via the price index
as in standard monopolistic competition models, and this is the reason why
we nd that R&D spending is non-monotonic in trade costs. The simplicity
of our model has the added advantage that we are able to perform classic
comparative static analysis, which makes the economics behind these changes
very transparent. Costantini and Melitz, and Atkeson and Burstein, on the
other hand, have to rely on numerical simulation for most of their results.5
Other related papers include Bustos (2007) and Navas and Sala (2007)
who study technology adoption in the Melitz model and show that trade
liberalization raises the incentive of exporters to adopt a more advanced
technology. Gustafson and Segerstrom (2006) also introduce innovation into
4A similar eect is discussed in Aghion and Grith (2005), ch. 4.
5Other related papers include Ederington and McCalman (2008) and Yeaple (2005) who
examine the eect of trade liberalization on technology adoption. The adoption process
also leads to ex-post dierences in rm productivity. Haaland and Kind (2008) employ a
model in which R&D and exports are determined simultaneously, but their focus is on the
eect of R&D subsidies.
4the Melitz (2003) model; R&D in their model is carried out in an innovation
sector and depends crucially on the presence of intertemporal knowledge
spillovers in the innovation sector.6 Vannoorenberghe (2008) studies process
innovation in the Melitz model; he nds that larger exporters invest more in
innovation, and rms entering export markets raise their R&D spending.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model. In Section 3 we investigate the eects of trade liberalization under
the assumption that rms are homogenous. This provides a useful benchmark
to evaluate the impact of rm heterogeneity. The core of the paper is in
Section 4, which contains the results for the case of heterogeneous rms.
Section 5 concludes, and the Appendix contains proofs.
2 The Model
We consider a reciprocal dumping model of trade with two segmented mar-
kets: the home and the foreign market. Firms in the two markets produce a
homogeneous good and engage in Cournot competition. Consumers in each
market have quadratic quasi-linear preferences that give rise to a linear in-
verse demand function,
pj = A   Qj; (1)
where pj and Qj denote price and total sales in market j. Labor is the only
factor of production and comes in xed supply. Assuming that the numeraire
good is produced under constant returns to scale at unit cost and traded
freely on a competitive world market, the equilibrium wage in each country
is equal to one, and trade is always balanced.
The per-unit trade cost on shipments between countries is denoted by
t. We treat t as a resource cost, such as the cost of transporting goods or
overcoming non-tari barriers. Trade liberalization is modelled as a marginal
fall in t in both countries.
6See also Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) for a model of how trade aects innovation
and growth when rms are heterogeneous.
5Let n denote the number of entrants in each market. Firms produce un-
der constant (but ex-ante unknown) marginal cost, equal to the unit labor
requirement. We assume that the marginal cost of rm i = 1;:::;n, denoted
by ci, is revealed to the rm only after it has incurred a sunk set-up cost
f > 0 and invested an amount ri  0 in R&D. By conducting R&D a rm
increases its chances to become a lower-cost rm. The probability that rm
i's marginal cost is less than or equal to ci is given by G(ci), where
G(ci) = g(ri)F(ci); g(0) = 1; g
0 > 0; g
00  0: (2)
The ex-ante cumulative distribution F(ci) has support on the interval [0; c].
Obviously, expression (2) is dened only as long as G(ci)  1.7 The cost of
R&D is given by
(ri) : (0) = 0;
0 > 0;
00  0: (3)
We assume that both the level of R&D and the marginal-cost realization
are private information of each rm. Hence output decisions are made under
asymmetric information, and the R&D investment has no eect on the output
choice of rival rms.8 Upon learning its marginal cost, rm i will produce
a quantity y(ci) for the domestic market and x(ci) for the export market.
This output decision will depend on the expected output of all rival rms in
the domestic market, denoted by b Q i.9 Firm i's rst-order condition for its
domestic sales yi(ci) is
p(yi(ci) + b Q i) + yi(ci)p
0(yi(ci) + b Q i)   ci  0;(= 0 if yi(ci) > 0): (4)
From (4), we may derive the critical marginal cost, e cyi  A   b Q i; for
which rm i's domestic sales become zero. Then the rst-order conditions
7Precisely, G(ci) = min(g(ri)F(ci);1).
8An increase in R&D therefore cannot serve as a commitment device to be more ag-
gressive in both markets. This is similar to the model of Haaland and Kind (2008) which
assumes that outputs and R&D are determined simultaneously by each rm.
9That is, rms have to take expectations even after entry, since the (unobserved)
marginal cost draws of their rivals determine these rivals' output choices and thus residual
demand in the domestic and foreign markets.
6give rise to the decision rule10
yi(ci) =

0 if ci  e cyi;
1
2 (e cyi   ci) if ci < e cyi: (5)
Since in the current model a rm's mark-up is the same as its output, the
ex-post prot in the domestic market is equal to
i(ci) =

0 if ci  e cyi;
1
4 (e cyi   ci)
2 if ci < e cyi:
(6)
Similarly, let b Q
 i denote the expected output of all rivals in the export
market. Firm i's rst-order condition for its exports xi(ci) is
p(xi(ci) + b Q

 i) + xi(ci)p
0(xi(ci) + b Q

 i)   t   ci  0, (= 0 if xi(ci) > 0), (7)
and the critical marginal cost for which its exports become zero is e cxi 
A   b Q
 i   t. Hence the quantity of exports is
xi(ci) =

0 if ci  e cxi;
1
2 (e cxi   ci) if ci < e cxi; (8)





0 if ci  e cxi;
1
4 (e cxi   ci)
2 if ci < e cxi:
(9)















(e cxi   ci)
2 dF(ci): (11)










0(ri) = 0: (12)
10See also Cramton and Palfrey (1990), Lemma 5 (p. 26 and pp. 41-2).
7Since rms are identical prior to learning their cost realization, equilibrium
R&D spending will be the same for all entering rms. For future convenience,




0(b r) = 0: (13)





Since all entrants choose the same R&D level, the expected outputs of
rms will coincide in equilibrium. Furthermore, since the two countries are
identical, the expected domestic and export sales of home rms will be identi-
cal to those of foreign rms. In its local market rm i will face n 1 domestic
rivals, each expected to produce and sell b y units, and n rivals from abroad,
each expected to sell b x units; hence, b Q i = (n   1)b y + nb x. Similarly in its
export market, the rm competes with n   1 other exporters and n local
rms so that b Q
 i = nb y + (n   1)b x. The critical values of the marginal cost
can thus be written as
e cy = A   (n   1)b y   nb x; (14)
e cx = A   (n   1)b x   nb y   t: (15)
Using symmetry, the following Lemma shows that the expected local and
export sales of a rm are determined by a system of only two equations:













8Proof: See Appendix A.1. 
















[A   (n   1)b x   nb y   t   c]
2 dF(c): (19)
In our analysis below we will refer to the eect of trade liberalization
on rm and industry productivity. We follow Melitz (2003) in dening rm
productivity as the inverse of the marginal production cost, and industry
productivity as the inverse of the expected marginal cost, conditional on
rms producing positive output. This conditional expectation is given by






Next we examine how trade liberalization in the form of a marginal re-
duction in t aects the equilibrium of the model. We rst consider the case of
homogeneous rms. This provides a benchmark against which we can com-
pare the eect of rm heterogeneity. We then turn to the full model and show
what dierence rm heterogeneity makes.
3 Trade Liberalization with Homogeneous
Firms
Firm homogeneity means that all incumbent rms and all potential entrants
have the same marginal cost function. There is hence no private information,
and the model is formally equivalent to one in which rms, after deciding
on entry and exit, simultaneously choose R&D, domestic output and export
sales; the key point is that the R&D investment does not play a strategic
role in the output choice.
9It is natural to let R&D directly impact the marginal cost of production.
Hence writing marginal cost as c(r),11 with c0 < 0, the prot of a home rm
is equal to (A Q c(r))y +(A Q  c(r) t)x (r), and the rst-order
conditions of prot maximization with respect to y, x and r, respectively, are
given by
A   Q i   2y   c = 0; (21)
A   Q

 i   2x   c   t = 0; (22)
 c
0(x + y)   
0 = 0: (23)
Dening    c00(x + y)   00 < 0, and assuming that  + c02 < 0, it is
straightforward to show that the second-order conditions are satised.12 Free
entry and exit of rms implies the following zero-prot condition for a home
rm:
(A   Q   c)y + (A   Q
   c   t)x      f = 0: (24)
If R&D is excluded, the model is essentially identical to the original Bran-
der (1981) model. The introduction of R&D into the model leaves the eects
of trade liberalization on a rm's domestic and export sales as well as on the
number of rms qualitatively unchanged. The impact of trade liberalization
on R&D spending by a rm is unambiguously positive, whether or not there
is free entry. In particular, we can show:
Proposition 1 If rms are homogeneous, trade liberalization (i) raises a
rm's exports and reduces its domestic sales, (ii) increases the rm's overall
sales, (iii) raises the rm's R&D spending, and (iv) raises industry produc-
tivity. These results hold both with and without free entry. In addition, (v) if
there is free entry, trade liberalization raises the number of rms.
Proof: see Appendix A.2. 
The intuition for these eects is straightforward. Trade liberalization exposes
rms to tougher import competition, forcing them to reduce domestic sales.
11Our model is equivalent to the last section's model except that costs depend on R&D
deterministically, and thus rms do not select themselves in equilibrium.
12See Appendix A.2 for details.
10But it also allows them to expand their exports. The increase in export
sales exceeds the fall in domestic sales. This expansion in rm output raises
the marginal benet of undertaking cost-reducing R&D.13 The expansion in
rm output and the rise in R&D spending both imply higher prots, which
induces entry. The increase in R&D spending reduces the marginal cost and
thus raises productivity both at the rm and the industry level; we will refer
to this as the direct eect of trade liberalization.
Since R&D has no strategic eect, rms completely internalize the costs
and benets of R&D. That is, rms raise their R&D because it increases their
prot relative to the case where R&D spending is held xed. This implies
that social welfare is higher than in the Brander model, which corresponds
to the case where R&D spending is xed at zero. Qualitatively, however,
trade liberalization has the same welfare eects as in the Brander model.
Specically, we prove in Appendix A.5 that when the number of rms is xed,
the welfare eect of trade liberalization is non-monotonic. Suciently close to
autarky, a marginal reduction in trade costs reduces welfare. Close enough to
free trade, it raises social welfare.14 When the market structure is endogenous,
social welfare is equal to consumer surplus. Since trade liberalization raises
both the output per rm and the total number of rms, industry output and
thus consumer surplus rise unambiguously.15
13A similar eect is also found by Licandro and Navas-Ruiz (2008) who go on to inves-
tigate the consequences for economic growth.
14In the Brander model welfare in each country is equal to AQ   Q2=2   cQ   tnx.
Dierentiating welfare w.r.t. t shows that welfare is convex in t and has a minimum at
tmin  (2(A c)(n+1))=(2+n(5+4n)). A marginal decrease in t thus reduces welfare if t
is between tmin and the prohibitive level, and it increases welfare if t is smaller than tmin.
If we treated the trade cost not as a pure resource cost but as a tari, then tari revenue
would also enter the social welfare function. To see where this matters consider a marginal
increase in t starting from t = 0. This increase generates positive tari revenue and hence
raises welfare. This is the well known result that the optimal tari in the Brander model
is positive.
15This is exactly the result shown by Brander and Krugman (1983) in the case without
R&D.
114 Trade Liberalization with Heterogeneous
Firms
We now examine the impact of trade liberalization when rms are hetero-
geneous. It turns out to be convenient to separately analyze the case of no
entry and the case of an endogenous market structure, because the two dier
signicantly from each other and from the homogeneous rm case.
4.1 No-Entry Case
In the absence of market entry the equilibrium b y, b x and b r are determined
by equations (13) - (17). To derive the comparative static eects of a reduc-
tion in t we totally dierentiate these equilibrium conditions. This yields the
following comparative static results:
Proposition 2 If rms are heterogeneous and there is no market entry,
trade liberalization (i) increases a rm's expected exports; (ii) decreases its
expected local sales when trade costs are high; (iii) increases a rm's expected
total output when trade costs are suciently low; (iv) increases (decreases)
rm-level R&D when trade costs are low (high); and (v) raises industry pro-
ductivity.
Proof: see Appendix A.3. 
The main dierence relative to the case of homogeneous rms is that the
eect of trade liberalization on R&D spending is no longer monotonic. What
is more, when the trade cost is high, the eect on R&D is the exact opposite
of the one in the homogeneous rm model: trade liberalization now reduces
R&D. Since trade liberalization raises R&D spending for low trade costs,
it has to be the case that with heterogeneous rms R&D spending has an
interior minimum.
To develop intuition for these results consider the eect of trade liberal-
ization on the threshold values of the marginal cost, e cy and e cx. For t = 0 we
obviously have e cy = e cx: there is only one critical value such that rms with
12marginal cost draws below this value are active on the integrated home and
foreign markets, whereas rms with higher marginal costs do not produce
any output. For t > 0, we must have e cy > e cx. The most ecient rms|
those with cost draws below e cx|produce for both the domestic and export
markets, rms with cost draws between e cy and e cx sell only on the domestic
market; rms with marginal costs above e cy do not sell anything. Moreover,
as shown in Appendix A.3, de cy=dt > 0 and de cx=dt < 0. This implies that as
trade costs decline, the threshold cost level e cx rises, so that more rms will
now be able to export. On the other hand, the threshold cost level e cy falls,
meaning that rms that before were barely ecient enough to sell on their
local market are now forced to produce zero output.
Consider rst how trade liberalization aects a rm's expected sales hold-
ing xed the level of R&D expenditure. Expected export sales rise, since
trade liberalization raises the probability that any given rm will be ecient
enough to be able to export, and allows those rms that do export to in-
crease their shipments abroad. Expected domestic sales decrease, since rms
respond to import competition by reducing local sales. In addition, the like-
lihood that a given rm will be able to sell on its local market falls. These
arguments explain the increase in export sales (part (i) of the Proposition)
and the fall of domestic sales when trade costs are high. Domestic sales may
rise or fall if trade costs are low due to changes in R&D spending. Specically,
expected domestic sales may even rise after trade liberalization if increased
R&D leads to such a strong shift in the cost distribution such that the ex-
pected marginal cost drops substantially. The eect of trade liberalization on
total sales of a rm is unambiguously positive (part (iii)) only when trade
costs are low, as the expected increase in exports more than compensates
even an expected decrease in domestic sales. The eect is ambiguous in the
case of high trade costs.
How does R&D respond to a reduction in the trade cost? A rm sell-
ing only on the domestic market would want to reduce its R&D spending,
since tougher competition from imports decreases its output and hence also
13the marginal benet from R&D. An exporter would want to increase R&D,
since the increase in its export sales more than compensates for the decrease
in local market share, meaning that it has a greater incentive to invest in
cost-reducing R&D. This is exactly the same reasoning as in the case of ho-
mogeneous rms: With t suciently close to zero, a rm's expected export
volume is suciently large to tip the balance in favor of increasing R&D in
response to a marginal fall in trade cost. Expected domestic sales can even
rise if increased R&D leads to a big enough reduction in expected marginal
costs. By contrast, if t is near the prohibitive level, another mechanism takes
over: both the expected volume of exports and the probability of being an
exporter become very small (b x and e cx are low) relative to the probability of
facing import competition on the domestic market. That is, the risks of facing
competition by foreign rms are greater than the chances aorded by export
opportunities. This implies that for high trade costs, R&D spending falls as
trade is liberalized. This explains the non-monotonic relationship between
trade costs and R&D in part (iv).
Like in the case of homogeneous rms trade liberalization has a direct
eect on expected rm productivity due to changes in R&D investment.
However, as shown above, the sign of this eect now depends on the size
of trade costs. When it comes to industry productivity, rm heterogeneity
induces an additional eect that is not present when rms are homogeneous,
namely a selection eect. That is, expected industry productivity rises as
the least ecient rms are driven to produce zero output. This eect is
stronger than the eect of reduced R&D (in the case of high trade cost), and
it ultimately determines how trade liberalization aects expected industry
productivity.
The welfare eects of trade liberalization are qualitatively similar to those
with homogeneous rms. We show formally in Appendix A.6 that the eect
on expected social welfare is positive when trade costs are suciently low,
and negative when trade costs are near the prohibitive level. Since expected
output increases with trade liberalization, it follows that consumer surplus
14must rise. The eect on the domestic rms' expected prots is generally
ambiguous. For t suciently close to zero the usual pro-competitive eect
of trade liberalization dominates, meaning that the increase in consumer
surplus caused by tougher competition more than compensates for the decline
in expected industry prots. If t is near the prohibitive level, the rise in
consumer surplus is outweighed by the fall in the aggregate prots of home
rms, because the expected increase in prot on export sales is very small
compared with the reduced prot in the domestic market.
4.2 Endogenous Market Structure
Now consider the case of an endogenous market structure. Free entry and









 is a function of r, t and n, this equation implicitly denes r as
a function of t and n. Using (25), we may therefore rewrite the rst-order







Assuming that this equation has a unique positive solution, r(t;n) = b r > 0,
we obtain:
Lemma 2 If rms are heterogeneous and market structure is endogenous,
rm-level R&D is independent of the trade cost.
This means that in a free-entry equilibrium any change in the trade cost leads
to an adjustment in the number of rms such that the incentive to undertake
R&D remains unchanged.16 We will explain the intuition for this result below.
16Atkeson and Burstein (2006) and Eaton and Kortum (2001) also feature results that
trade liberalization leaves rm-level R&D unchanged. In both papers a reduction in trade
costs, per se, raises the incentive to innovate. In Atkeson and Burstein, however, the wage
of managers required for innovation also rises. When all rms export, it rises so much that
15For now, it is important to note that this prediction diers fundamentally
from the case of homogeneous rms, where trade liberalization leads rms
to raise their R&D spending even under free entry. Also recall that with
homogeneous rms trade liberalization raised aggregate R&D in the industry
through two separate eects, namely through the increase in R&D per rm
and through an increase in the number of rms. Lemma 2 implies that in
the case of heterogeneous rms any eect of trade liberalization on aggregate
R&D can only come from a change in the equilibrium number of rms. In
fact, we will show that the equilibrium number of rms and hence aggregate
R&D spending fall, when the trade cost is suciently high.
According to Lemma 2, we may treat R&D expenditures as a xed cost
and use equations (16), (17) and (25) to solve for the remaining endogenous
variables (n;b x; b y). We may rewrite these equations as
2b y  
Z A (n 1)b y nb x
0
G(c)dc = 0; (27)
2b x  
Z A (n 1)b x nb y t
0
G(c)dc = 0; (28)
Z A (n 1)b y nb x
0
[A   (n   1)b y   nb x   c]
2 dG(c) + (29)
Z A (n 1)b x nb y t
0
[A   (n   1)b x   nb y   t   c]
2 dG(c)   4(f + (b r)) = 0:
Total dierentiation of (27), (28) and (29) yields the following comparative
static results:
Proposition 3 If rms are heterogeneous and market structure is endoge-
nous, trade liberalization (i) increases a rm's expected exports and decreases
its expected local sales; (ii) increases a rm's the expected output if the trade
the innovation eort remains constant. In Eaton and Kortum the osetting eect comes
from the fact that trade liberalization raises the likelihood that a foreign competitor makes
an innovation and captures the whole market.
16cost is high; (iii) increases (decreases) the number of rms and hence aggre-
gate R&D if the trade cost is low (high); and (iv) raises industry productivity.
Proof: see Appendix A.4. 
Trade liberalization has the same eects on the threshold levels of marginal
cost as in the xed market structure case (see Appendix A.4). The impact
of trade liberalization on expected domestic and export sales is therefore
straightforward: the probability that a given rm exports rises as do sales of
each exporting rm abroad. Increased competition from abroad reduces both
the probability that a rm remains viable and the local sales of viable rms.
Firm heterogeneity drives the result that trade liberalization reduces the
number of entrants and raises expected output of each rm when the trade
cost is high: like in the no-entry case, trade liberalization increases the risk
of facing import competition relative to the chance of beneting from better
access to the export market. Greater expected import competition forces
rms to expand output to keep the expected prot at zero. As rms become
bigger, the number of entrants has to fall. To understand why we observe a
dierent eect at low trade costs, consider an innitesimal decrease in the
trade cost close to free trade. Such a decrease leaves the expected output of a
rm nearly unchanged because the trade cost is already low, but it increases
expected prot. Hence at free trade, and by continuity suciently close to
it, trade liberalization will raise the number of entrants and therefore also
industry-level R&D.
Proposition 3 also helps to explain Lemma 2 and is consistent with Propo-
sition 2. In the no-entry case trade liberalization leads to an increase in R&D
and higher expected prots when the trade cost is low, but it reduces R&D
spending and expected prots when the trade cost is high. Greater expected
prots induce market entry as indicated by Proposition 3, which in turn
makes R&D less protable. When trade liberalization reduces expected prof-
its, rms exit and the incentive to undertake R&D rises. Market entry and
exit thus counteract the R&D eects observed in the no-entry case. This
suggests that the mechanism that drives Lemma 2 is fairly general, even if
17the result that these eects exactly oset each other so that rm-level R&D
stays constant is specic to our model.
Since R&D per rm remains constant, trade liberalization aects industry
productivity only through the selection eect. By forcing the least ecient
rms to leave the market trade liberalization unambiguously raises industry
productivity. In the case of homogeneous rms we get the same outcome but
for entirely dierent reasons. Recall that with homogeneous rms the channel
through which trade liberalization aects industry productivity consists of
an increase in R&D per rm and in the number of entrants.
Finally consider the eects of trade liberalization on social welfare. Since
expected prots are zero due to free entry, the eect of trade liberalization
on social welfare is equal to the eect on consumer surplus. As in the case
of homogeneous rms, total industry output and hence consumer surplus
unambiguously increases with trade liberalization (see Appendix A.6 for a
formal proof).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a simple model of international trade with hetero-
geneous rms to explore the eects of trade liberalization on rms' innovation
incentives, as well as on industry productivity, and social welfare. We found
that the eect on expected industry-level R&D spending is non-monotonic.
That is, trade liberalization raises industry R&D expenditure when the trade
cost is low, and reduces industry R&D expenditure when the trade cost is
high. When there is no market entry, this is due to the underlying changes
in rms' R&D investments. In the case of an endogenous market structure,
trade liberalization induces changes in the number of rms such that each in-
dividual rm has no incentive to alter its R&D spending. The industry-level
R&D pattern then arises due to the relationship between the trade cost and
the number of rms.
The impact of trade liberalization on industry productivity is dominated
by the selection eect, by which the least ecient rms are forced to pro-
18duce zero output in the short run and leave the market in the long run. Hence
trade liberalization unambiguously leads to higher industry productivity, de-
spite that fact that aggregate R&D spending may rise or fall. This result is
important because the productivity enhancing eect of trade is often por-
trayed as one of the main reasons why trade liberalization may raise social
welfare. When the market structure is endogenous, the higher industry-level
productivity indeed translates into higher consumer surplus and social wel-
fare. However, our paper also showed that this may not be true in the short
run when there is no entry.
Firm heterogeneity plays a crucial role in obtaining these results. We
found that quite a few of the eects derived under rm homogeneity are
not robust to the introduction of rm heterogeneity. This is especially true
for the eects of trade liberalization on R&D investment at the rm- and
industry-level. In the case of homogeneous rms a marginal reduction in
trade costs boosts R&D spending at the rm and industry level irrespective
of whether there is entry or not and irrespective of the level of trade costs.
With rm heterogeneity industry-level R&D spending reaches a minimum
strictly between zero and the prohibitive trade cost, as does rm-level R&D
spending in the no-entry case.
The results of our paper are broadly consistent with the recent empir-
ical literature on the eects of trade liberalization on plant productivity,
which stresses the importance of rm heterogeneity. The basic complemen-
tarity between innovation and exporting captured by our model|namely
that rms are more likely to export if they innovate, and are more likely to
innovate when they see good export opportunities|is also well documented
by these studies (e.g., Lileeva and Treer (2007), Aw, Roberts and Winston
(2007), and Bustos (2007)). There is also empirical evidence that rms try
to boost their productivity to increase their market opportunities, which our
model predicts to happen in specic cases (see Lopez (2009), Emami-Namini
and Lopez (2006), Alvarez and Lopez (2005), and Hallward-Driermeier et al.
(2002)).
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A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Expected output for the home market is








[e cy   c]dF(c) (A.1)
and expected exports to the foreign market are








[e cx   c]dF(c): (A.2)
Evaluating the integral on the right-hand side of (A.1) by parts, and dening
(c)  [e cy   c], we have
Z e cy
0














because (e cy) = F(0) = 0 and 0(c) =  1. A similar derivation leads to the
expected export level.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
This proof has three parts. First, we establish that the second-order condi-
tions of prot maximization are satised. Second, we derive the signs of the
comparative static eects for the short-run scenario where N is xed. Third,
we sign the comparative static eects for the case of an endogenous market
structure.









20The rst principal minor is  2, the second principal minor is 4. The third
principal minor, the Hessian itself, is equal to 4(+c02) < 0, since +c02 <
0 by assumption. This establishes the second-order conditions. For further
reference note that 4( + c02) < 0 implies (2n + 1) + 2c02 < 0.
In the short run, the equilibrium is determined by (21), (22) and (23).
Since Q = Q = n(x + y) in equilibrium, we can rewrite these conditions as
A   nx   (n + 1)y   c = 0; (A.3)
A   ny   (n + 1)x   c   t = 0; (A.4)
 c
0(x + y)   
0 = 0: (A.5)
Totally dierentiating these conditions, we obtain
2
4
 (n + 1)  n  c0


















The Jacobian determinant jJj = (2n + 1) + 2c02 < 0. Using Cramer's Rule









(n + 1) + c02





(2n + 1) + 2c02 < 0:
In the free entry equilibrium, the equilibrium conditions also include the
zero-prot condition
(A   n(x + y)   c)y + (A   n(x + y)   c   t)x      F = 0: (A.6)




 (n + 1)  n  c0  (x + y)
 n  (n + 1)  c0  (x + y)
 c0  c0  0
























21where the rst three zeros in the last row come from the rst-order conditions
w.r.t. y;x;r. The Jacobian determinant is jJj =  (x + y)2((2n + 1) +
2c02) > 0. Changes of the endogenous variables with respect to t, according




x + (x + y)(n + c02)





x(n + c02) + y((n + 1) + c02)












(x + y)2  0 (< 0 for x > 0): (A.10)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (14) and (15) in (16) and (17), and then dierentiating (16), (17) and






























; 22  2 + g(n   1)F(e cx); 23  gnF(e cx);
31  b rr; 32 =  
4g0
g
((n   1)b x + nb y); 33 =  
4g0
g
((n   1)b y + nb x);










2[(2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1] + b y












22We rst establish that  > 0. Since gnF(e cx) < 2 + g(n   1)F(e cx) and
gnF(e cy) < 2 + g(n   1)F(e cy), 2 < 0 and hence b rr2 > 0. Thus,  > 0
will hold true if we can show that 1 > 0. We will show that 1 > 0 by
contradiction. We observe rst that 1 > 0 if (2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1  0
and (2n   1)(1   gF(e cx))   1  0. Thus, 1 < 0 requires that (2n   1)(1  
gF(e cy)) 1 < 0 and/or (2n 1)(1 gF(e cx)) 1 < 0. Since gF(e cy)  gF(e cx),
(2n 1)(1 gF(e cx)) 1  (2n 1)(1 gF(e cy)) 1, and we have to consider
two possible cases:
Case 1: (2n   1)(1   gF(e cx))   1 > 0;(2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1 < 0
In this case,
1 > b x
2[(2n 1)(1 gF(e cy)) 1]+4nb xb y = b x(b x[(2n 1)(1 gF(e cy)) 1]+4nb y) > 0
because b y > b x and 4n >  (2n   1)(1   gF(e cy)) + 1.
Case 2: (2n   1)(1   gF(e cx))   1 < 0;(2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1 < 0
First observe that for zero trade costs, b x = b y, F(e cx) = F(e cy) and
1 = 2b y
2(2n   1)(2   gF(e cy)) > 0
Hence, 1 < 0 warrants the existence of a critical  x < b y such that
 x
2[(2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1] + b y
2[(2n   1)(1   gF(e cx))   1] + 4n xb y = 0:




8n2b y2   4[(2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1][(2n   1)(1   gF(e cx))   1]b y2
(2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1
Note carefully that (2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1 2 [ 1;0] so that  x is larger
than the numerator in absolute terms. The negative solution is irrelevant as
it implied  x > 4nb y which violates  x < b y. The positive solution fullls  x < b y
only if
q
8n2b y2   4[(2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1][(2n   1)(1   gF(e cx))   1]b y2
> (4n   1)b y:
23However,
q
8n2b y2   4[(2n   1)(1   gF(e cy))   1][(2n   1)(1   gF(e cx))   1]b y2
<
p
8n2b y2 = 2
p
2nb y < (4n   1)b y;
so that no solution exists in the relevant range and 1 > 0 holds also for that
case. This proves that  > 0.













2 + g(n   1)
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2F(e cx) + b x
2F(e cy)








For the critical values of marginal costs we obtain
de cy
dt














2 + (n   1)b xb y
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2b rr + g
3(n   1)F(e cy)b rr   8g











   
b x=0
=  1:
Evaluating the derivatives of b r and b y at t = 0 (where b x = b y and thus


































2nF(e cx)F(e cy) is ambiguous.





































2f(e cx)F(e cy)) < 0;
where f(e cx) = F 0(e cx) > 0 is the density at the critical cost level of exports.
Consequently, both b r and b y have a local maximum at b x = 0, while b x has a
local minimum. Since b r declines with t at t = 0, there must exist a global
minimum strictly between free trade and the prohibitive trade cost level.







2 [2   gF(e cy)]+b y [2b x   b ygF(e cx])+
b rr

















2 [2   gF(e cy)] +
b rr














f(e cx)(g(2   gF(e cy))) is ambiguous;
it is not clear whether output per rm has a local minimum or a local max-
imum at b x = 0.
25Using dG(c) = g(b r)dF(c)  g(b r)f(c)dc, the eect of trade liberalization
on industry productivity is calculated as follows:
d
dt






























because de cy=dt > 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3























a11  (b x + b y)G(e cy); a12  nG(e cy); a13  2 + (n   1)G(e cy);
a21  (b x + b y)G(e cx); a22  2 + (n   1)G(e cx); a23  nG(e cx);
a31   4(b x + b y)
2; a32 =  4((n   1)b x + nb y); a33 =  4((n   1)b y + nb x);
b1 = 0; b2 =  G(e cx); b3 = 4b x:
The determinant is
   8(b x + b y)[b x(2   G(e cy)) + b y(2   G(e cx))] > 0:










8b y(b x + b y)G(e cx)
 




8b x(b x + b y)G(e cy)
 




8(b x + b y)(b xG(e cy)   b yG(e cx))
 
:










































b x(2 + 7G(e cy))
8((2   G(e cy))b x + (2   G(e cx))b y)




7b x(2   G(e cy)) + 16b y















The eects of trade liberalization on n and ^ q are generally ambiguous,
but can be evaluated at free trade and at the prohibitive level of trade costs.






















Hence, n has a local maximum at b x = 0: Since n decreases with t close to
t = 0, it follows that n must have an interior minimum between t = 0 and
the prohibitive trade cost level. As per-rm R&D is constant, this implies
that aggregate R&D, too, must have an interior minimum.
With respect to total expected rm output we nd
db q
dt




































This implies that b q has a local minimum at b x = 0: We cannot determine with-
out further assumptions whether b q has a local minimum or a local maximum
at t = 0.
Note from (A.11) that the eect of trade liberalization on industry pro-
ductivity is positive since de cy=dt  0 (> 0 for b x > 0).
A.5 Welfare Eects with Homogeneous Firms
When the number of rms is xed, welfare in each country is equal to W =
AQ   Q2=2   cQ   tnx   n with Q = n(x + y). Dierentiation yields
@W
@x
= n(A   n(x + y)   c   t); (A.13)
@W
@y







0(x + y)   
0) = 0: (A.16)



















n((ny   (3n + 2)x)) + (y   3x)c02
(2n + 1) + 2c02 :
Evaluating the derivative at zero trade costs (t = 0 and hence x = y) and




















(2n + 1) + 2c02 > 0;
28respectively.
When the market structure is endogenous, social welfare is equal to con-















x((n + 1 + ny=x) + 2c02)
(x + y)((2n + 1) + 2c02)
 0 (< 0 for x > 0):
A.6 Welfare Eects with Heterogeneous Firms
In the case of a xed number of entrants, the welfare eect of integration
consists of the eect on aggregate expected prots and consumer surplus.




























b y   b x;
taking into account that @b =@r = 0. Let c CS  (nb q)2=2 denote expected













































For t = 0 (where b x = b y and thus F(e cx) = F(e cy)), we obtain
dc W
dt







2b rr(2   gF(e cy) + 2gnF(e cy)(1   gF(e cy)))  
32g02b y2
g2 (1 + 2n(1   gF(e cy)))

< 0:






























b rrF(e cy)f(e cx) < 0:
Hence welfare has a local maximum at b x = 0. This, together with the fact
that welfare decreases with t when t is near zero, implies that social welfare
has an interior minimum.
In the case of an endogenous market structure, as prots are zero due to
free entry, the welfare eect of trade liberalization is identical in sign to the










b x(b x + b y)(2   G(e cy))
 
 0 (< 0 for b x > 0):
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